Twitter released last week its results for the financial year 2015. The event offered mixed news, the significant increase in revenues (from $1.4bn in FY14 to $2.2bn in FY2015) being offset by the stagnation of the monthly active user base to 320m over the last 2 quarters of the year.
By judging at the share price evolution over the next trading day, stock markets were clearly not expecting such an outcome. Share price dropped by as much as 14% before recovering and closing the day with a limited loss of 1.9% – although no new data had been released in the meantime.
This behaviour illustrates the difficulty analysts and investors have to value many of the ‘2.0’ companies. LinkedIn learnt it the hard way, giving up half of its market capitalisation in one day after announcing its 2015 results a couple of weeks ago. Other companies such as Google, Facebook or Amazon also had their own fights against the stock market but now offer relative steadiness in an industry known for dramatic and disruptive change.
Twitter is even more of a ‘tough beast’ since, contrary to the three other companies listed above, it keeps bleeding cash. Lots of cash. As much as $580m in 2015. The situation is not hopeless though. In one hand, the company’s operating cash flow (i.e. the cash generated by ‘day-to-day’ activities) increased significantly, from $82m in 2014 to $383m in 2015. On the other hand, over the last couple of years, the company spent an average of $1bn per year in investing activities. Investors are now trying to assess whether Twitter’s survival goes through colossal investment needs and, if so, whether Twitter will be able to generate sufficient operating cash flows to offset these costs.
Part of the answer lies in the purpose and the business model of Twitter. Both of which are not very clear and distinctive. We use Facebook primarily to interact with friends, LinkedIn is our professional ‘shop window’, Google provides services making our life easier (including email). Conversely, the ‘raison d’etre’ of Twitter’s 140-sign messages is far from obvious – and the way to monetise them is even less so. By judging at the relative variance in analysts’ target share prices, this questioning seems widely shared.
Last but not least, the Twitter case also embodies the shortcomings of EBITDA as a meaningful financial aggregate. Despite the Enterprise Value / EBITDA ratio being widely used by investors, the EBITDA aggregate is in this case meaningless and even more when it is ‘adjusted’ as per Twitter accounts. Losing $580m of cash is indeed not incompatible with the fact of reporting a highly positive adjusted EBITDA – $558m to be precise. The main reason is that the large investments Twitter agrees to today are by definition capitalised and amortised and therefore accounted for in the ‘Depreciation & Amortisation’ line of the P&L (that is to say, below EBITDA). As written earlier, disregarding these investment needs when valuing the company would be careless.